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speaker is necessarily committed to the truth of a very large num-ber of background
entailments (only some of which are presented in [І8 a.-d.]). On any occasion of utterance
[17], however, the speaker will indicate how these entailments are to be ordered. That is, the
speaker will communicate, typically by stress, which entailment is assumed to be in the
foreground, or more important for interpreting intended meaning, than any others. For example,
in uttering [19a.], the speaker indicates that the foreground entail-ment, and hence her main
assumption, is that Rover chased a certain number of squirrels.
[19] a. Rover chased THREE squirrels.
b. ROVER chased three squirrels.

In [19b.], the focus shifts to Rover, and the main assumption is that something chased
three squirrels. One function of stress in English is, in this approach, clearly tied to marking the
main assumption of the speaker in producing an utterance. As such, it allows the speaker to
mark for the listener what the focus of the message is, and what is being assumed.
A very similar function is exhibited by a structure called an 'it-cleft' construction in English, as
shown in [20].

[20] a. It was ROVER that chased the squirrels.
b. It wasn't ME who took your money.
In both examples in [20], the speaker can communicate what he or she believes the
listener may already be thinking (i.e. the foreground entailment). In [20b.] that foreground
entailment (someone took your money) is being made the shared knowledge in order for the
denial of personal responsibility to be made. The utterance in [20b.] can be used to attribute the
foreground entail- ment to the listener(s) without actually stating it (for example, as a possible
accusation). It is one more example of more being com-municated than is said.

COOPERATION AND IMPLICATURE

In much of the preceding discussion, we have assumed that speakers and listeners
involved in conversation are generally cooperating with each other. For example, for reference
to be suc-cessful, it was proposed that collaboration was a necessary factor. In accepting
speakers' presuppositions, listeners normally have to assume that a speaker who says 'my car'
really does have the car that is mentioned and isn't trying to mislead the listener. This sense of
cooperation is simply one in which people having a con-versation are not normally assumed to
be trying to confuse, trick, or withhold relevant information from each other. In most cir-
cumstances, this kind of cooperation is only the starting point for making sense of what is said.
In the middle of their lunch hour, one woman asks another how she likes the hamburger she is
eating, and receives the answer in [І].
[І] A hamburger is a hamburger.

From a purely logical perspective, the reply in [І] seems to have no communicative
value since it expresses something completely obvious. The example in [І] and other
apparently pointless expressions like 'business is business' or 'boys will be boys', are called
tautologies. If they are used in a conversation, clearly the speaker intends to communicate
more than is said.
When the listener hears the expression in [І], she first has to assume that the speaker is being
cooperative and intends to com-municate something. /That something must be more than just