Page 222 - 4188

220

By definition, deception intentionally misleads another party in a
way that implicitly provides an advantage to the deceiver (Aquino, 1998;
Boles et al., 2000; Lewicki, 1982). Deception can be an active process,
as when individuals misrepresent a situation by giving false information,

or a passive one, as when individuals conceal information (Bok, 1978;
Ekman, 2001). These two forms of deception are frequently referred to
in the negotiation literature as sins of commission and sins of omission,

respectively (Murnighan et al., 1999; O’Connor & Carnevale, 1997;
Schweitzer & Croson, 1999; Spranca, Minsk & Baron, 1991).
Any situation that has a competitive element, including
negotiations, is likely to involve deception (Aquino & Becker, 2005;

Hegarty & Sims, 1978; Lewicki, Saunders & Minton, 1999; Murnighan,
1991; Tenbrunsel, 1998). However, still relatively little is understood
about the factors that trigger deception in negotiation. In the early 90s,

research by Lewicki et al. (1994) and by Murnighan (1991) identified
four factors driving deception in negotiation: greed, competition,
uncertainty and experienced injustice. Because of these factors, self-

interested negotiators are likely to deceive their counterpart so that they
can reach better outcomes for themselves (Boles et al., 2000). These
drivers have received empirical support over the last two decades. For

instance, Lewicki and Spencer (1990) found that negotiators who expect
to negotiate with a competitive counterpart are more willing to deceive
than negotiators who expect to negotiate with a cooperative counterpart.
In addition to these four main drivers, prior research on deception

has suggested that the characteristics of the individual and the situation
will affect individuals’ propensity to deceive, either alone or in
interaction (e.g., Hegarty & Sims, 1978; Lewicki, 1982; Schweitzer &

Croson, 1999; Trevino, 1986). They are higher for males (Robinson,
Lewicki & Donahue, 2000), in dyads with high cognitive trust (Olekalns
& Smith, 2009), for negotiators with an individualistic orientation
(O’Connor & Carnevale, 1997; see also De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995),

and in bargaining contexts where the victims are powerless and
anonymous (Tenbrunsel & Diekmann, 2007).
Regardless of the reasons motivating deception in negotiation,

once negotiators intentionally misrepresent information at the bargaining
table they recruit various justifications for their unethical actions (see
Ayal & Gino, 2011 for a discussion of justifications individuals

generally use after cheating). For instance, they may justify their actions
by convincing themselves that their counterpart did not have good